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Abstract
Dynamic taint analysis (DTA) is a technique used for
tracking information flow by propagating taint propagation
across memory locations during program execution. Most
implementations of DTA are based on dynamic binary in-
strumentation (DBI) frameworks or whole-system emula-
tors/virtual machine monitors. The boundary of informa-
tion tracking with DBI frameworks is a single process, while
system emulators can cover a host, including the OS. Using
system emulators, it may be possible to consider taint prop-
agation across multiple processes executing locally, within
the emulator. However, there is an increasing need for
tracking information flow across single-system boundaries
and across the whole enterprise.
We describe a proof-of-concept architecture for tracking
multiple mixed-information flows among several processes
across a distributed enterprise. Our DTA tool is based on
PIN, a DBI framework by Intel, and the concatenated DTA
processing is realized with per-host flow managers. We have
tested our prototype with typical enterprise applications. As
a motivating example, we track information leakage due to
a SQL injection attack from a web-based database server
query. Our work is of an exploratory nature, aiming to ex-
pose our early findings and identify areas where additional
research is needed in improving usability and performance.
1 Introduction
In recent years, security problems related with the flow
of information have been increasing. Managers of informa-
tion systems need to worry about information leakage by
web attacks (such as SQL injection and cross-site script-
ing) or insider activity (whether inadvertent or malicious),
among other threats. Especially for web applications, in-
formation leakage vulnerabilities are currently considered a
top concern [1].
Dynamic taint analysis (DTA) is a technique for tracking
information flow within an instance of a software applica-
tion (process) or a host system. It can be used to detect 0-
day (previously unknown) attacks or information leakage,
depending on how it is used. A DTA tool tracks informa-
tion flow via supervising execution of program instructions.
Such instrumentation granularity supports substantial cov-
erage of program execution. Most DTA implementations
are based on dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) frame-
works, whole system emulators, or virtual machine moni-
tors. Therefore, the boundary of information tracking with
DBI frameworks is a single process, while with system em-
ulators it is a single system (including the guest operating
system kernel). In the latter case, it may be possible to
consider information flow among multiple processes that
are executing within the emulated environment. However,
there have been no efforts to concatenate DTA processing
and tracking across host boundaries to see how information
flows among networked systems within an enterprise.
In this paper, we present an experimental framework
to realize concatenated DTA processing between processes
which may be located in different host systems. Our frame-
work consists of (1) a DTA tool (SeeC) and (2) a per-host
flow manager.
As with previous DTA work, our DTA implementation
dynamically tracks data flow dependencies at the machine
instruction level. Our DTA tool is built on a DBI frame-
work so that it can be attached to an existing (binary com-
piled) software without recompilation, and without requir-
ing source code availability. Moreover, our tool supports
4-byte labels (i.e., colored tainting), thereby allowing us to
track mixed/multiple information flows simultaneously.
To track information flow between processes, we instru-
ment inter-process communication (IPC) facilities in each
monitored process. Our approach is to place information
flow managers on participating hosts. The managers keep
track of their remote peers, and relay inter-process taint
information. Currently, our framework supports concate-
nated DTA processing with TCP channels between DTA-
monitored processes.
As a motivating scenario, we describe an experiment us-
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ing a typical website configuration composed of an Apache
web server and a MySQL database server. Setting up an
SQL injection attack that triggers information leakage flow
from resources in the database server via the web server, we
can successfully identify the leakage with our framework.
While this is a single, and rather straightforward applica-
tion of concatenated DTA, we believe that it demonstrates
the desirability of such a mechanism. We identify limita-
tions with our current approach and opportunities for further
research. We view our work as proof-of-concept, aiming to
motivate further work in this space.
Paper Organization Section 2 presents our DTA imple-
mentation based on the PIN DBI framework. Section 3
describes ourframework for concatenated DTA processing.
Section 4 shows an experiment to capture information leak-
age by an SQL injection attack. We discuss related work in
Section 5.
2 Single-Process DTA
To track information flow of a single program, we have
implemented a dynamic taint analysis tool (SeeC) which
monitors data flow in a program instance. This section de-
scribes our design and implementation of SeeC.
2.1 Information Flow Model
A running program instance (process) is comprised of a
sequential execution of machine instructions. When an in-
struction is executed, data are involved in many cases as the
instruction format may take one or more source and/or des-
tination operands. At a single instruction execution, data
bytes are copied from one location (register or memory) to
another (or the same) location, as specified by the operands.
Some instructions may perform data transformations in-
stead of just copying. In both cases, dynamic dependencies
exist among memory locations and the data stored therein.
Basically, we identify information flow from these actions
of data copy or transformation: i.e., information flows from
memory source(s) to memory destination(s).
There is another type of dynamic dependency, based on
program control structure (indirect information flow). For
example, in the following code, the two variables a and b
have a dependency, as the value of variable b is indirectly
decided by the value of a.
if (a == 1)
b = 1;


















Figure 1. Dynamic taint analysis: (1) initial
marking, (2) propagation, and (3) assertion
Our implementation, described next, currently does not
consider such control dependencies. Tracking indirect in-
formation flow reveals considerably many more dependen-
cies without a commensurate increase in accuracy and rel-
evance; stated another way, tracking indirect information
flow often leads to significant “noise” by exposing many
more potential data dependencies.
2.2 Design and Implementation
The basic architecture, shown in Figure 1, keeps track of
the association between a taint tag in shadow memory and
memory/registers handled by program instructions. For ex-
ample, if an instruction causes information to flow directly
(e.g., via memory copying) or indirectly (e.g., as part of an
arithmetic operation that uses a tainted memory location as
an operand) from one memory location to another, our tool
updates the taint tags of the corresponding locations in the
shadow memory.
The implementation of a DTA tool can be realized
with two different view points: (1) whole-system approach
[16, 18] based on virtual machine monitors [5] or sys-
tem emulators [6, 7], and (2) process-oriented approach
[13, 14] based on dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI)
frameworks [2, 3, 4]. Our implementation is based on PIN,
a DBI framework developed by Intel [2], targeting process-
based analysis. PIN supports rich APIs for manipulating
processes at runtime.
2.2.1 Shadow Memory for Tag Management
Information flow tracking with DTA involves shadow mem-
ory that reflects the taint status of a specific memory area
or the registers 1 that are used during the execution of na-
tive applications. Depending on usage purposes, the map-
1For the registers, we currently consider the 8 general registers of the
x86 architecture.
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ping granularity between shadow memory and application
memory/registers can be different. In some previous work,
each bit of process memory has a corresponding unit size
of shadow memory (tag) [29, 30]. In our tool, we adopt 1-
byte precision to improve performance and reduce memory
requirements: each byte of application memory is mapped
to a unit in shadow memory. A change of any bit in a byte
results in tainting the tag for that byte as a whole.
SeeC supports two different unit sizes in shadow mem-
ory: 1 byte in application memory can be associated with
a 1-bit or a 4-byte2 unit in the shadow memory. It is a
trade off because using 1-bit unit size tag results in a smaller
shadow memory footprint. However, a 4-byte unit size en-
ables a tag to retain more information. For information
tracking purposes, we use 4-byte tags used as a bitmap.
Our tool can thus record 32 values for any process mem-
ory byte, realizing colored tainting (track the combination
of different data). The current version of SeeC manages the
shadow memory with a page-table-like structure, allowing
us to scale memory requirements with the actual process
address space in use.
2.2.2 Tag Propagation
To capture information flow dependent on copy and trans-
formational dependencies, SeeC propagates taint markings
according to the following propagation and clearance poli-
cies:
• If at least one source operand is tainted, then the desti-
nation operand(s) should be also tainted.
• If the all inputs to an operation are clear, the destina-
tion operand(s) should be also cleared.
According to the above policies, in a single assigment
instance m = x (e.g., mov) the tag would be propagated
as tag(m) = tag(x) (tag(x) means the tag value of the
memory or register associated with variable x). As the
value of m is overwritten by x, it also means that if tag(x)
is clear, tag(m) will also be cleared. By simple induc-
tion, a sequence of assignments causes transitive propaga-
tion thereby realizing flow tracking.
When two or more input operands are involved, e.g.,
m = x + y, the tag value of the destination operand is cal-
culated as tag(m) = tag(x)|tag(y), where | is the bitwise-
OR operation. For 4-byte tags, all the bit-fields of the two
source operands are preserved at the destination tags. This
is an important feature as some instructions that perform
transformations may involve mixed flow of information. For
example, we should identify the mixed flow with the follow-
ing code snippet.
2The size of 4 bytes corresponds to the integer size in 32-bit architec-
tures.
result[i] = buf1[i] + buf2[i]
In the code, buf1 and buf2 may come from different data
sources. As SeeC supports colored tainting, we can identify
both sources referring to the tag associated with the buffer
named result.
In the x86 architecture, there are a number of other issues
to be considered in addition to the basic propagation policy.
SeeC includes implicit operands for its tag propagation. For
example, the div instruction involves the eax and/or edx
registers together with explicit operands.
As a rule of thumb, we also consider some special sit-
uations that result in constant values. For example, xor
%eax, %eax always causes %eax to be filled with the
value 0. In that case, %eax should be marked as un-
tainted/uncolored. Other cases involve non-deterministic
values read from the host machine, such as rdtsc 3. On the
other hand, if such values are deterministic, reading them
could lead to implicit flow similar to control flow depen-
dencies. Since we do not track implicit flow, all the above
cases result in the destination’s tag to be cleared.
2.2.3 Taint Sources
Taint sources are starting points where SeeC initially marks
a tag for newly introduced data of concern with a proper
“color” value. Each color value is associated with a de-
scription of the data source: e.g., it may describe where the
data comes from or label some other information about the
source. The main source points are system calls where read-
like operations are performed to introduce data from outside
the process, such as from a file, the network, etc. Currently,
SeeC allows users to designate their source points of inter-
est for file and network sources as a command line option.
For those file and network stream sources, users can define a
filename or IP address/port for selective sourcing, or can de-
fine a whole range of streams (e.g., data from any file, or any
TCP streams). Moreover, a user can specify a certain mem-
ory area to be tainted for specific applications. SeeC can
apply regular expressions to incoming data, to select only
part for tracking. For example, we can just mark the URI
part of an HTTP request for subsequent tracking through a
web server.
2.2.4 Taint Sinks
Taint sinks are data destination points, mostly on write-like
system calls, where SeeC performs some assertion or valid-
ity checking for outgoing file or network stream data. Nor-
mal usage of SeeC at a sink point is to check tag information
corresponding to the (buffer) memory of the outgoing data.
For example, we can identify the original source informa-
tion if the tag maintains information about the data source,













Figure 2. Architecture (peer view)
as the tags are transitively propagated through the process.
3 DTA Across System Boundaries
3.1 System Design and Implementation
In the previous section, we presented an information flow
tracking tool that operates within a single application: our
DTA tool is attached to a single process to track information
flow within its boundary. To realize information flow track-
ing across multiple applications and even across system
boundaries, we need to observe the native data exchanged
via inter-process communication (IPC) between interacting
applications. Here, we limit our discussion to IPC via TCP
connections.
Figure 2 depicts our architecture. The main purpose
of our mechanism is to deliver additional tag data when
data transfer happens. For example, when a process
(App1) sends data to another process (App2) invoking the
write() or writev() system call, the DTA module at-
tached to App1 passes to App2 the corresponding tag data,
which may contain source information about the native data
currently being transfered. App2 invokes a system call such
as read() or readv() to receive the native data. The
SeeC of the receiver side (App2) then appropriately trans-
lates the tag data received, and reflects them to its shadow
memory. Continuing DTA processing of App2, the infor-
mation about the data source which comes from App1 can
still be maintained and finally be spotted at the sink point(s)
of App2. In other words, we concatenate DTA processing
of the supervised connections of communicating processes.
A single host may contain multiple processes monitored
by DTA tool instances, and a process can make several
DTA-supervised connections to its corresponding peers in
the same host or in other hosts. To handle multiple DTA
processes and connections, we place a flow manager in each
host. The flow manger handles process membership, ses-
sion management of DTA for supervised connections, and
coordinated delivery of tag data.
3.1.1 Membership and Session Management
A communicating peer may either be participating in in-
formation flow tracking under SeeC, or it may just run na-
tively without any instrumentation. We call a process that
is supervised with SeeC a tracking group member. If the
peer process is a member, the source point of one member
and the sink point of the other member can be concatenated
in terms of DTA processing. Otherwise, SeeC would just
record possible information available within the process at
the source/sink points. The peer could be another process
in the same system or located in a different host.
If a process is launched with SeeC to participate in an
information tracking session, SeeC registers its process id4
to the local flow manager, establishing an IPC channel with
it. When a TCP communication channel is established with
a corresponding process, SeeC queries the peer manager
as to the membership status of the peer, so as to decide
whether to further perform concatenated DTA processing
for the given channel. The flow manager located in the peer
host responds to the membership query. As SeeC initiates
the query with the established peer’s channel information,
i.e., IP address and port, those also need to be registered in
the flow manager. It is also possible to communicate with
a remote process that is not equipped with SeeC (for which
there is no peer flow manager). In that case, the remote pro-
cess is considered a non-member and concatenated DTA is
not performed to that process.
To establish information about the TCP channel ses-
sion, SeeC instruments accept() and connect() sys-
tem calls. When a TCP channel is successfully created, and
if the two processes are both members, they each make a
membership query about the peer with the given channel
information through the interaction of their respective flow
managers. Each then stores the peer’s information locally so
that SeeC can use it for tracking purposes. SeeC also cre-
ates a queue data structure (write q) for the given channel
in the flow manager. After we determine the peer’s mem-
bership information, the system call returns. The session is
managed until the close() system call is invoked for the
channel.
3.1.2 Tag Data Delivery
To realize concatenated DTA processing, tag data should be
delivered with native data to the peer recipient so that the
peer process can reflect the tag information in its shadow
memory at its source points. The tag recipient should be
careful that the received tag data is reflected to the shadow
4SeeC and the monitored process operate within the same address
space.
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Figure 3. Tag data delivery with a queue
memory area with which the receiving buffer is correctly
associated. Unfortunately, dealing with a TCP channel we
cannot expect synchronized write()–read() pairs of
system calls in both sides for a given socket descriptor.
However, we can deliver tag data for the successfully
transferred native data by using a simple FIFO queue struc-
ture (write q) to hold tag data, as shown in Figure 3, with-
out concern about the system call synchronization or the re-
flected memory location in the tag recipient. This is because
the TCP channel is an ordered byte stream, from the point
of view of a process.
We instrument read() and write() system calls and
the following post operations are performed before the calls
are returned5.
• write(): push tag data into the write q of a corre-
sponding channel (fd) for the successfully transferred
data of size w and its address range (&w buf[0] –
&w buf[w-1]) in order.
• read(): for the successfully received data of size r,
request corresponding tag data from the peer’s flow
manager. The flow manager pops up the requested data
from the write q and sends to the recipient. Then,
the recipient reflects the tag data to the appropriate ad-
dress range (&r buf[0] – &r buf[r-1]).
Since the TCP channel is ordered, we can expect that there
are already pushed tag data of size w′, accumulated and
associated with multiple write() calls made previously
in the sender, when a read() system call returns r and
w′ >= r.
3.1.3 Tag Resolution
As our framework is decentralized, the SeeC instance of
each process maintains its own mappings between tag data
and information source (a source information is mapped to a
“color” value of a tag). Therefore, it is necessary to perform
color value resolution for the newly introduced tag data with
5The same actions apply to readv() and writev().
the data sender. SeeC makes queries for this purpose to the
peer flow manager.
3.1.4 Threat Analysis
It is worthwhile considering the security implications of an
adversary targeting our architecture.
Evasion: As our architecture depends on the underlying
DTA tool for information tracking, attackers may possibly
evade the framework by somehow avoiding the taint propa-
gation tracking. The discontinuation is possible if the DTA
tool does not cover all the instructions involved in informa-
tion flow. It is also possible that an attacker may exploit
dependencies other than those supported by the DTA tool.
As discussed earlier, SeeC does not currently track implicit
information flow. Fortunately, malwares that exploit such
implicit flow have not been reported to date. However, we
plan to enhance traceability by adding support for control
dependencies and to increase the coverage of machine in-
structions supported by SeeC.
Subversion: Our framework needs to protect communi-
cation between flow managers by adding mutual authenti-
cation and tag encryption facilities, to prevent active or pas-
sive attacks by attackers in the network. Given that our ar-
chitecture is intended for use within a single enterprise, the
problem of key management is relatively straightforward;
to protect the actual communications, a protocol such as
TLS/SSL or IPsec is sufficient.
Members that are under an attacker’s control cannot be
trusted to provide truthful DTA information. Determining
the trustworthiness of a system is an extremely hard prob-
lem, with no known solution to date. Our architecture does
not currently address the issue of operation within a par-
tially compromised/hostile environment.
4 Experiments
In this section, we describe an experiment demonstrat-
ing distributed information flow tracking, wherein we have
captured information leakage by an SQL injection attack in-
volving web and database servers residing in different hosts.
4.1 Identifying Information Leakage by a
SQL Injection Attack
Our experiment used the Apache web server (version
2.2.9) with PHP script support (version 5.2.6). For
database server, we used MySQL (version 5.0.51). We
attached SeeC to the Apache (httpd) and MySQL server
daemons (mysqld) for information flow tracking, using














FD(11) # NETWORK SOCKET
Local [IP: 127.0.0.1, PORT: 8080, LISTEN:0]
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Figure 4. Information leakage by a SQL injection attack.
We set up an example SQL injection attack, shown
in Figure 4. The web server uses the information from
the database table users, actually stored in the file
users.MYD in the host machine of the database server, for
authentication purposes, e.g., matching the asserting user-
name and password of a user trying to log in. Obviously,
that information should not be leaked outside of the web
server boundary. Once a user logs in successfully, a web
page displays shopping items for customers through a PHP
script. Shopping items are stored in the shop items table
(shop items.MYD), and the contents are retrieved with
the following simple query string:
select * from shop_items where id=’$id’
The page fails to check the user-supplied string from the
login web form; thus, an attacker can sucessfully inject the
following string via the web form associated with the PHP
variable $id to extract user information from the database:
’ union select 1,name,passwd,1,
load_file("/etc/passwd") from users #’
Therefore, the processing results in the following (ex-
ploited) query string that includes the attacker-supplied ad-
ditional select phrase:
select * from shop_items where id=’’
union select 1,name,passwd,1,
load_file("/etc/passwd") from users #’’
Although the original service would list shopping items
from the shop items table, the exploited query string re-
trieves name and password data from the users table to-
gether with the contents of the /etc/passwd file of the
system on which the database server runs.
To detect such an information leakage, we set up taint
sources and sinks as follows:
Taint sources: We have specified taint sources on the
database server host to be any database (*.MYD) and
the /etc/passwd file. The MySQL server reads
such information with read() or pread() system
calls.
Taint sinks: Any network output streams in the web server
are sink points. On the web server, HTTP replies are
sent via a writev() system call.
With a test attack request, we could successfully identify
the original information sources at the sink point: Figure 4
includes a log of such sink capturing in the writev() sys-
tem call (one of iovec structures). With the colored taint-
ing, sources in the database server host are discriminated in
the sink point of the web server.
During the experiment with the MySQL server, we also
identified a taint laundry effect. As our test query involves
a string function load file(), the query processing first
reads the users table and the /etc/passwd file, then
prepares the response by writting its contents to a tempo-
rary file. Therefore, the taint propagation is discontinued
because the result, forwarded to the web server, is from the
temporary file which is not associated with a taint label that
concerns us. We built a makeshift connection for this ex-
periment to avoid the taint laundry effect. In practice, we
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Table 1. MySQL sql bench performance: The
unit for the create MANY table benchmark
is table (i.e., tables created). The unit for the
other benchmarks is record row.
Benchmark Quantity Native With SeeC
create MANY
tables 10000 15s 43s
insert 30000 29s 604s
select cache 10000 57s 3447s
would be using filesystem features such as Extended At-
tributes to keep track of tainted information that has been
written to the filesystem.
4.2 Performance
To evaluate the overhead introduced by SeeC, we have
tested it with a heavily CPU-oriented application: gzip
compressing 261MB of Linux kernel source code in a
lightly loaded machine. We have two implementations that
differ in the shadow memory structure. The incurred over-
head with the simple, naive approach was approximately
28.1X, while with the page-table-like structure it was about
15.2X. For reference, a simple PIN-based tool that only
instruments instructions and does nothing for analysis in-
curred 1.28X. This shows that there is significant scope for
improvement in our tool.
MySQL is a complex multi-threaded server application.
We ran a benchmark test with sql bench tool for a
MySQL server supervised by SeeC. Table 1 shows results
from benchmarks related to creating tables, inserting and
selecting records. Our test runs show 2.9X, 25.2X, and
60.5X overheads for each test case respectively.
To see the penalty of instrumenting a TCP channel for
concatenated tainting process, we transferred a 1MB size
random file over netcat (nc) and measured the com-
pletion time. The overhead was approximately 190X, which
is not surprising given the need for multiple system calls for
each actual data transfer.
In the current unoptimized framework, the overhead
comes mostly from instrumenting the TCP channel: hook-
ing I/O-related system calls in the application layer and
transferring taint tag information to the connecting peers.
The transfers also involve interaction with other processes
(flow managers). We could enhance the performance by
normalizing tag information and only sending limited-size
representative tags, and using an in-kernel infrastructure for
delivering addtional tag information. For the performance
of DTA, some works focus on the issue [13, 19].
5 Related Work
DTA Implementations Recently, there has been much
work on implementing DTA with DBI frameworks or
whole-system emulators. TaintCheck [12], LIFT [13], Dy-
tan [14] and Flayer [15] are implemented using DBI frame-
works such as Valgrind [3], StarDBT [4], and PIN [2]. In
contrast, TaintBochs [17], Argos [16], and Panorama [18]
are implemented on whole-system emulators such as Bochs
[6] or QEMU [7]. Because software-based implementations
typically incur significant performance overhead, there have
been efforts to implement DTA in hardware [8, 11, 9, 10].
DTA Uses TaintCheck and Argos are designed to de-
tect previously unknown control-hijacking attacks, such as
buffer overflow or format string vulnerabilities, and also in-
clude signature generation features. Sweeper [21] and Vig-
ilante [22] used DTA to analyze worm viruses and generate
antibodies or alert information. TaintBochs and Panorama
showed how DTA can be used to capture information flow
of specific real-life applications in system-wide view. Egele
et al. [20] applied DTA to monitoring behavior of BHO ob-
jects in Windows, to detect privacy-leaking spyware.
There has been work on adopting static or dynamic taint
propagation (analysis) as type systems to perceive informa-
tion flow for confidentiality or integrity purposes. Shankar
et al. [27] applied static taint analysis, extending the C lan-
guage type qualifier, to taint or untaint program variables to
detect format string attacks. Huang et al. [24] extended the
PHP language to track information flow by inserting type
qualifier. Data variables, associated with types, are classi-
fied with a lattice structure thereby preventing integrity or
confidentiality violations in web applications.
SQL Injection and DTA As SQL injection attacks have
taken off in recent years, there have been efforts to secure
web applications against SQL injection using information
flow techniques. Lam et al. [25] applied sound static in-
formation flow analysis and model checking to detect taint-
based vulnerabilities. Halfond et al. [23] proposed positive
tainting, i.e., tracking trusted data, as opposed to normal
negative tainting, i.e., tracking unstrusted data. The propa-
gated trusted data flow is evaluated (before it is used as an
SQL string) in a syntax-aware manner to reduce false pos-
itives. Nguyen-Tuong et al. [26] modified the PHP inter-
preter to include a precise taint propagation facility. Against
SQL injection, they check whether operators, keywords, or
identifiers in SQL strings are tainted.
6 Conclusion
We have described SeeC, an experimental proof-of-
concept framework for tracking information flow across
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system boundaries. SeeC tracks information flow within a
single process by propagating taint during instruction exe-
cution, and uses a flow manager to arbitrate tag delivery by
concatenating the data sources and sinks of communicating
processes. We have shown a simple scenario with an SQL
injection attack that involves unintended information leak-
age.
Our current implementation is a proof of concept. We
plan to design a new architecture with performance in mind,
and to apply the decentralized information flow model to
enforce confidentiality and integrity policies across a dis-
tributed enterprise.
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